...............this
is a book libertarians with an enthusiasm for history will find very,
very interesting indeed — though probably not so much for its
extremely illuminating discussion of Southeast Asian history as for
its even more illuminating observations on the place of the state in
human history generally.
"Until
shortly before the common era," Scott writes, which is to say
the last 2000 years, "the very last 1 percent of human history,
the social landscape consisted of elementary self-governing kinship
units that might, occasionally, cooperate in hunting, feasting,
skirmishing, trading, and peacemaking. It did not contain anything
one could call a state. In other words, living in the absence of
state structures has been the standard human condition."
According
to Scott, world history may be divided intofour eras: 1) a stateless
era (by far the longest), 2) an era of small-scale states encircled
by vast and easily reached stateless peripheries, 3) a period in
which such peripheries are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion
of state power, and finally, 4) an era in which virtually the entire
globe is 'administered space' and the periphery is not much more than
a folkloric remnant. The progression from one era to the next has
been very uneven geographically (China and Europe being more
precocious than, say, Southeast Asia and Africa) and temporally (with
peripheries growing and shrinking depending on the vagaries of
state-making). But about the long-run trend there can be not a shred
of doubt.
Not
surprisingly, Scott thinks the state's importance is usually
exaggerated by historians.
The very earliest states in China and Egypt — and later, Chandra-Gupta India, classical Greece, and republican Rome — were, in demographic terms, insignificant. They occupied a minuscule portion of the world's landscape, and their subjects were no more than a rounding error in the world's population figures. In mainland Southeast Asia, where the first states appear only around the middle of the first millennium of the common era [around 1500 years ago] their mark on the landscape and its peoples is relatively trivial when compared with their oversized place in the history books. Small, moated, and walled centers together with their tributary villages, these little nodes of hierarchy and power were both unstable and geographically confined. To an eye not yet hypnotized by archaeological remains and state-centric histories, the landscape would have seemed virtually all periphery and no centers. Nearly all the population and territory were outside their ambit.
Each
of these early states, according to Scott, was
an ingathering of previously stateless peoples. Some subjects were no doubt attracted to the possibilities for trade, wealth, and status available at the court centers, while others, almost certainly the majority, were captives and slaves seized in warfare or purchased from slave-raiders. The vast "barbarian" periphery of these small states was … the source of hundreds of important trade goods and forest products necessary to the prosperity of the … state … [as well as] the most important trade good in circulation: the human captives who formed the working capital of any successful state. What we know of the classical states such as Egypt, Greece, and Rome, as well as the early Khmer, Thai, and Burmese states, suggests that most of their subjects were formally unfree: slaves, captives, and their descendants.
their
subsistence routines, their social organization … and many elements
of their culture … are purposefully crafted both to thwart
incorporation into nearby states and to minimize the likelihood that
statelike concentrations of power will arise among them. State
evasion and state prevention permeate their practices and, often,
their ideology as well.
Another
way of saying this might be that densely populated, prosperous
trading centers, where civilization exists in its most advanced form
are usually taken over by a state of some kind before they have been
densely populated, prosperous trading centers for very long. The same
might be said about the more prosperous and more densely populated
farm towns. In effect, ironically, the state is the price of
civilization — not, as the statists believe, because the state is
necessary to safeguard or protect civilization, but rather because it
is civilization the state fastens upon like a leech or a tapeworm,
because the most civilized societies are the wealthiest and thus the
most profitable to loot. If you want to live in a civilized place,
you'll probably have to put up with the state. Faced with that
dilemma, there have been a lot of people who have chosen to walk away
from civilization and thereby escape the state rather than stay in
civilization and attempt to reform or abolish the state.
Of
course, as Scott notes, in the early state's propaganda counseling
against any such walking away from civilization, "the linkage
between being civilized and being a subject of the state is … taken
for granted." And countless generations of historians have
followed the lead of the early state's court intellectuals and
cheerfully "confounded 'civilization' with what was, in fact,
state-making." As a result, Scott argues, we find ourselves
today with a "huge literature on state-making, contemporary and
historic, [that] pays virtually no attention to its obverse: the
history of deliberate and reactive statelessness. This is the history
of those who got away."
Scott
understands that a reader in 21st-century America may well regard his
argument with a certain incredulity.
At a time when the state seems pervasive and inescapable, it is easy to forget that for much of history, living within or outside the state — or in an intermediate zone — was a choice, one that might be revised as the circumstances warranted. A wealthy and peaceful state center might attract a growing population that found its advantages rewarding.
Still,
"it appears that much, if not most, of the population of the
early states was unfree; they were subjects under duress." And
"it was very common for state subjects to run away." For
"living within the state meant, virtually by definition, taxes,
conscription, corvée labor" — that is, forced, unpaid,
short-term labor, such as being required to work a day or two unpaid
on a road-repair crew — "and, for most, a condition of
servitude."
Thus
the early state extruded populations as readily as it absorbed them,
and when, as was often the case, it collapsed altogether as the
result of war, drought, epidemic, or civil strife over succession,
its populations were disgorged. States were, by no means, a
once-and-for-all creation. Innumerable archaeological finds of state
centers that briefly flourished and were then eclipsed by warfare,
epidemics, famine, or ecological collapse depict a long history of
state formation and collapse rather than permanence. For long periods
people moved in and out of states, and "stateness" was,
itself, often cyclical and reversible.
Of
course, it wasn't only famine, epidemics, or internal struggles for
political power that brought down these fragile early states. At
least as often, it was greed. As Scott observes, "one might have
expected statecraft to consist in sailing as close to the wind as
they could: that is, in extracting resources just short of the point
at which they would provoke flight or rebellion. … [T]his would be
the most reasonable strategy." But it wasn't the strategy most
of these early states actually pursued.
For
example, the early rulers in Southeast Asia knew that the fiscal
capacity of the population varied widely, as it would in any agrarian
economy, from season to season depending on harvest fluctuations due
to weather, pests, and crop diseases. Even theft and banditry could
be a factor here: concentrated above-ground grain crops were just as
big a temptation to gangs of thieves, rebels, or rival kingdoms as
they were to the state. Allowing for the great variation in the
cultivators' capacity to pay year by year would have required the
crown to sacrifice its own fiscal demands for the welfare of its
peasantry. All the evidence suggests that, quite to the contrary, the
precolonial and colonial states tried to guarantee themselves a
steady take, at the expense of their subjects. …
[G]iven
a choice between patterns of subsistence that are relatively
unfavorable to the cultivator but which yield a greater return in
manpower or grain to the state and those patterns that benefit the
cultivator but deprive the state, the ruler will choose the former
every time. The ruler, then, maximizes the state-accessible product,
if necessary, at the expense of the overall wealth of the realm and
its subjects.
As
long as even the most successful states were adjacent to areas they
couldn't control, however, the oppressed people still had somewhere
else to go. "Until at least the early nineteenth century,"
Scott writes, "the difficulties of transportation, the state of
military technology, and, above all, demographic realities placed
sharp limits on the reach of even the most ambitious states." In
Southeast Asia, for example, in 1600, the population density was
"only 5.5 persons per square kilometer … (compared with
roughly 35 for India and China)," so that any ruler's subjects
in Southeast Asia "had relatively easy access to a vast,
land-rich frontier." And just beyond that frontier lay the
uplands, the highlands, the hills, "an area roughly the size of
Europe" which Scott, in common with increasing numbers of
historians and social scientists, calls "Zomia."
Zomia is a new name for virtually all the lands at altitudes above roughly three hundred meters all the way from the Central Highlands of Vietnam to northeastern India and traversing five Southeast Asian nations (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Burma) and four provinces of China. … It is an expanse of 2.5 million square kilometers containing about one hundred million … peoples … at the periphery of nine states.
Zomia
is, Scott tells us, "one of the largest remaining nonstate
spaces in the world, if not thelargest."
In fact, Scott says, "the signal, distinguishing trait of Zomia
… is that it is relatively stateless. Historically, of course,
there have been states in the hills" but "while
state-making projects have abounded [there], it is fair to say that
few have come to fruition," and "those would-be kingdoms
that did manage to defy the odds did so only for a relatively brief,
crisis-strewn period."
The
human settlements that make up Zomia, Scott maintains, are "best
understood as runaway, fugitive … communities who have, over the
course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making
projects in the valleys — slavery, conscription, taxes, corvée
labor, epidemics, and warfare."
And
it should surprise no one, he writes, that virtually everything about
these people's livelihoods, social organization, ideologies, and …
even their largely oral cultures, can be read as strategic
positionings designed to keep the state at arm's length … to avoid
incorporation into states and to prevent states from springing up
among them.
For
example, the residents of Zomia typically practice what Scott calls
"escape agriculture: forms of cultivation designed to thwart
state appropriation." And "their social structure could
fairly be called escape social structure inasmuch as it was designed
to aid dispersal and autonomy and ward off political subordination."
If we want to understand the folkways, mores, and behavior of these
people, Scott insists, we must begin by acknowledging that "the
inhabitants of this zone have come, or remained, here largely because
it lies beyond the reach of the state."
This
does not mean, of course, that their decentralized societies lack any
coherent order. Scott writes, in fact, of his desire to "attempt
an account of the elementary units of political
order in
mainland Southeast Asia" and then comments: "I emphasize
the term political
order to
avoid conveying the mistaken impression that outside the realm of the
state lay mere disorder." And, interestingly, one of the chief
points he makes about the "elementary units of political order"
that he has found among the people of upland Southeast Asia is that,
and these are his words,
Their political structures are, with extremely rare exceptions, imitative in the sense that while they may have the trappings and rhetoric of monarchy, they lack the substance: a taxpaying subject population or direct control over their constituent units, let alone a standing army.
A
simpler way of saying this would be to say, employing Albert Jay
Nock's terminology, that the people of upland Southeast Asia have
government, but not the state. "As far back as one can follow
the run of civilization," Nock wrote in 1935,
it presents two fundamentally different types of political organization. This difference is not one of degree, but of kind. It does not do to take the one type as merely marking a lower order of civilization and the other a higher; they are commonly so taken, but erroneously. Still less does it do to classify both as species of the same genus — to classify both under the generic name of "government," though this also, until very lately, has always been done, and has always led to confusion and misunderstanding.
The
origin of government, Nock argued,
is in the common understanding and common agreement of society; … [G]overnment implements the common desire of society, first, for freedom, and second, for security. Beyond this it does not go; it contemplates no positive intervention upon the individual, but only a negative intervention.
Nock
believed that
the code of government should be that of the legendary king Pausole, who prescribed but two laws for his subjects, the first being, Hurt no man, and the second, Then do as you please; and … the whole business of government should be the purely negative one of seeing that this code is carried out.
By
contrast, Nock argued, the state
did not originate in the common understanding and agreement of society; it originated in conquest and confiscation. Its intention, far from contemplating "freedom and security," contemplated nothing of the kind. It contemplated primarily the continuous economic exploitation of one class by another, and it concerned itself with only so much freedom and security as was consistent with this primary intention; and this was, in fact, very little. Its primary function or exercise was not by way of … purely negative interventions upon the individual, but by way of innumerable and most onerous positive interventions, all of which were for the purpose of maintaining the stratification of society into an owning and exploiting class, and a propertyless dependent class. The order of interest that it reflected was not social, but purely antisocial; and those who administered it, judged by the common standard of ethics, or even the common standard of law as applied to private persons, were indistinguishable from a professional-criminal class.
Yet
James C. Scott, not only in his discussion of the refugees from the
state who live in Zomia, but also in his more general remarks about
the history of the state in human society, makes no distinction
between government and the state. About half the time, he refers to
the Zomians and to their counterparts in other areas of the world and
in other eras of world history as "ungoverned." The other
half of the time, he refers to these same groups of individuals as
"self-governing peoples." But, of course, if they are truly
"self-governing," they are not "ungoverned." They
are governing themselves. They are not practicing "the art of
not being governed"; they are practicing the art of not
beingruled.
This
may seem to be mere quibbling, but, like Nock, I think it's an
important distinction — a distinction that if not taken into
account will lead to confusion and misunderstanding. If Scott can
excoriate most of his fellow historians for confounding
"civilization" with "state-making," he himself
can be excoriated for confounding statelessness with lack of
government, particularly when it is clear from his own text that he
does grasp the difference — and the difference it makes.
The
Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast
Asia, by James C. Scott, is published in hardcover and now in
paperback by Yale University Press. Despite its flaws, it's a superb
and magnificently thoughtful piece of work.
…..............
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